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There are extensive literatures within economics and economic psychology on the allocation of 
household income within the household. These two literatures are largely disjoint but both use a 
concept of ‘income pooling’. In economics this refers to the independence of household decisions 
from  who  receives  the  income  within  the  household.  In  economic  psychology  it  refers  to  the 
management of household finances. This article uses a new Danish expenditure survey that gives 
information on both concepts and on the assignment of expenditures to consider the link between 
the two. More importantly, we investigate whether either type of pooling is related to the sharing of 
expenditures  between  the  two  partners.  We find that sharing does depend on who receives the 
income  within  non-pooling  households, but not on the economic psychological income pooling 
regime per se.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this article is to close somewhat the gap between the literatures in anthropology, 
sociology,  economic  psychology  –  hereafter  mentioned  only  as  economic  psychology  -  and 
economics that consider within household decision making and intra-household allocation.. Broadly 
speaking, economic psychological analysis is concerned with ‘process’ whereas economic analysis 
is more concerned with ‘outcomes’. For example, economic psychologists analyze who makes what 
decisions and what characterizes the decision-making process. In contrast, economists analyze what 
impact various factors that are related to power have on the distribution of consumption within the 
household. 
In our data we have, for the first time, respondents in a conventional family expenditure survey 
who are asked to state for whom the goods purchased are bought. For convenience we shall refer to 
this as ‘intrahousehold sharing’ or simply ‘sharing’.  Furthermore, the respondents were also asked 
about the decision processes within the family referred to as income pooling regimes or simply 
income  pooling  in  the  following.  Having  both  types  of  information  for  the  same  households 
facilitates a synthesis of the two strands of research in this area.  Here, we focus on the economic 
psychological and the economists’ approaches by investigating the extent to which the households 
are pooling their resources and sharing their expenditures/consumption.  
One  potentially  confusing  term  is  ‘income  pooling’,  because  it  is  used  differently  within 
economics and economic psychology. In economics, it refers to the idea (which formally originates 
with  Becker)  that  sharing  is independent of who actually brings the income into household. In 
economic psychology it denotes that household members report that they pool their incomes for 
financial  purposes  and  draw  on  this  pooled  income  for  common  and  individual  expenditures. 
Clearly the two concepts can diverge. For example, the household members may agree on how to 
spend money independently of who earns it (income pooling in the Becker sense), but also agree to 
keep  separate  accounts  and  pay  the  agreed  amounts  from  these  as  convenient.  Conversely,  the 
household members may agree to pool income in a joint account but the spending from this may   3 
depend on who is earning the money. To avoid confusion we shall refer to the economists’ concept 
as ‘Becker pooling’ and reserve the term ‘income pooling’ for the economic psychologists concept.  
Our  principal  interest  is  in  whether  the  intra-householld  allocation  of  income  and/or  income 
pooling (in the economic psychology sense) has an impact on the allocation of expenditures to the 
members of the household, without considering possible causal relationships between allocation of 
income and income pooling. As regards Becker pooling, we simply test for whether the within 
household allocation of income impacts significantly on the sharing of consumption. The influence 
of  income  pooling  in  the  economic  psychology  sense  is  more  subtle.  Here  we  expect  that  for 
couples who report a pooling regime, the intra-household allocation of consumption is concentrated 
around equal sharing. Consequently, the distribution of  income between the partners will have little 
or no impact on the distribution of  expenditure.  In contrast, couples who do not pool their income 
will have a more dispersed distribution of consumption with a mean that may diverge from equal 
sharing.  For  this  group  we  would  expect  that  the  distribution  of  income  does  matter  for 
consumption sharing. 
 
2. Two definitions of income pooling 
 
2.1. Income pooling for economic psychologists 
 
For  decades  economic  psychologists  have  taken  up  the  systematic  study  of  decision  making 
processes and power-relations within the family (see, for example, McDonald, 1980; Mizan, 1994; 
Vogler  &  Pahl,  1994;  Pahl,  2005;  Vogler  et  al,  2008).  Contemporaneously,  economists  have 
questioned the existence of a unitary (Beckerian) set of preferences for the household and have 
specified models allowing the individuals within the household to have different preferences over 
how to allocate the time and money available to them. 
There  is  a  long-standing  tradition  among  economic  psychologists  to  focus  on  the  association 
between a household’s financial organization and inequalities between partners in decision making   4 
(see,  for  example,  Blood  &  Wolfe,  1960;  Blumstein  &  Schwarz,  1983;  Treas,  1993;  Woolley, 
2003). Most studies argue that the power balance in a family relates to the comparative resources 
such as income, education and occupational status of husband and wife. Some authors have tested 
this resource theory (McDonald, 1980; Mizan, 1994), but it is difficult to relate the results of these 
analyses to the economists analyses of Beckarian pooling. For example, nowhere in the economic 
psychology  literature  do  we  know  of  a  clear  and  operational  definition  of  ‘power  within  the 
household’ even though this concept is central to much of the discussion. 
A complicating factor in this respect is that the financial management of households involves a 
diversity of decisions varying in importance, frequency and amounts of money involved, see, for 
example, Dobbelsteen and Kooreman (1997). Thus, Vogler and Pahl (1994) make a distinction 
between strategic control and executive management, where strategic control concerns important 
and infrequent decisions with the labour input being small in relation to resulting power so that the 
power  aspect  may  very  well  dominate  the  efficiency  argument.  Alternatively,  for  executive 
management,  concerning  time-consuming  and  routine  decisions  within  certain  limitations,  the 
efficiency argument is probably more persuasive and the household production approach may be 
most appropriate. We therefore ask questions relating to management usually referred to as income 
pooling regime questions. A critical issue is whether responses to these questions on power and 
income pooling bear any relation to the answers provided by the ‘economic’ analysis of outcomes. 
 
2.2 Income pooling for economists. 
 
The  Beckerian  pooling  model  or  more  precisely  the  “unitary”  model  associated  with  Becker 
(1991) treats the household as though it has a set of coherent goals (preferences) which guide the 
actions of all household members. This is now known as the ‘unitary’ model. The dissatisfaction 
with the unitary model arose initially from theoretical concerns. The first of these was the worry 
about the methodological soundness of assuming that an aggregate (the household) behaves like an 
individual. This was at odds with a widespread recognition in the aggregation literature that we   5 
cannot typically ‘aggregate to a representative agent’. The second broad motivation seems to have 
been the emergence of an explicitly feminist approach to economic analysis. This emphasized the 
importance  of  power  within  the  household  and  the  potential  importance  of  the  command  or 
potential command over economic resources in attaining individual goals within the household. 
Non-unitary analyses in economics were based either on (cooperative) bargaining models (Manser 
& Brown, 1980; McElroy & Horney, 1981) or on non-cooperative models (Ulph & Ulph, 1988; 
Woolley, 1993). 
The  empirical  evidence  against  the  unitary  model  lagged  somewhat  behind  the  theoretical 
literature but there is at present widespread agreement that the unitary model is inconsistent with 
various facets of household behaviour. In particular, many studies on individual household data 
reject  the  principal  prediction  of  the  unitary  model  that  the  distribution  of  income  within  the 
household should not have any impact on household outcomes such as labour supply, saving and 
demand patterns. The ‘Beckerian pooling’ prediction has been tested through observed individual 
incomes in households surveys (see, for example, Bourguignon et al., 1993; Browning et al., 1994; 
Browning  &  Chiappori,  1997;  Lundberg  et  al.,1997;  Phipps  &  Burton,  1998;  Thomas,  1990). 
However, in most cases the information is only on expenditures on clothing or on very aggregate 
expenditure  measures  with  the  exection  of  Phipps  &  Wolley  (2008),  who  investigate  spouses 
contribution to retirements savings plans. In this article we use information on all expenditures by 
the  household,  although  information  on  a  more  disaggregated  level  is  available,  see  Bonke  & 
Browning (2009). 
 
 3. Data 
 
The data are collected in conjunction with the Danish Household Expenditure Survey (DHES). 
This is a continuous survey of approximately 1,000 households per year. After a pilot in September 
to  November  1998,  surveying  began  in  early  1999  and,  given  our  sample  selection,  we  have 
information on 1,747 households by the end of 2004.  We only sample households ‘headed’ by a   6 
married  or  co-habiting  couple.  Furthermore,  to  diminish  heterogeneity  only  couples  with  both 
spouses between 18 and 59 years old are included in our sample. We also merged the expenditure 
survey data to information on income, household characteristics, etc. from administrative registers 
in Statistics Denmark.  
The  DHES  includes  a  questionnaire  and  an  accounting  book  (‘diary’),  the  latter  being  self-
administered and registering the purchases of each household member during a two week period. 
The innovation in our data collection is that for each item in the diary, the respondent records 
whether  the  item  was  bought  for:  ‘the  household’;  ‘the  wife’;  ‘the  husband’;  ‘the  children’  or 
‘other’. In general this extra reporting did not present any difficulties for respondents; see Bonke 
and Browning (2009) for a detailed analysis of the reponse rates etc.. These responses provide the 
basis for our analysis of consumption sharing. Specifically, we consider as ‘assignable’ expenditure 
that are allocated to the husband or the wife. 
From the questionnaire we have information about the spouses management of their incomes. 
Thus, the respondents were asked if they are pooling all their incomes not distinguishing between 
his and her money, only some part regarding other parts as his or her money, handling some money 
to the desposal of their partner, or having complete separate economies with each spouse’s earning 
belonging  only  to  him  or  herself.  These  so-called  income  pooling  regimes  have  been  used  by 
economic psychologist for decades, see e.g. Pahl (1989), Vogler (2005) and Ashby & Burgoyne 
(2008). Most studies find that a majority of households are pooling their incomes, which we also 
find here with around two-thirds belonging to this distritutional regime (table 1). As the remaining 
regimes  are  pretty  similar  in  their  orientation  towards  individuality  within  the  relationship 
(Burgoyne et al., 2007) and appear very infrequently, we collapse them into a non-pooling regime, 
which is also done by Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen (2007) using the same dataset. 
Also the keeping of separate bank accounts have been used as a proxy for the spouses’ jointness in 
household management, but there seems not to be any high correlation between the declaration of 
belonging to an income pooling household and the keeping of joint accounts (Burgoyne et al., 2007) 
nor that separate accounts are more often hold by men than by women (Woolley, 2003).    7 
The descriptive statistics for the information/variables applied in the following analyses are shown 




Table 1 around here 
 
4.  Hypotheses and non-parametric analysis 
 
The focus of this study is on the interactions between the income share, the pooling regime and 
the allocation of expenditures. In this section we present a detailed analysis of the relationship 
between the three, without taking into account other factors. In the next section we shall present a 
regression analsysis that does allow for other factors. 
From Bonke & Uldall-Poulsen (2007) we know that the wife’s share of the household income 
increases the likelihood of income pooling within households, when he earns more than 80 percent 
of the individual incomes. This is not the case for other income shares, and a possible interpretation 
is that without income sharing living conditions would be to too skew to keep the marriage going 
and/or that this pooling regime is simply the norm among traditional breadwinner families. This is 
in line with the argumentation by Pahl (2005) that couples are becoming more individualized in 
there finances making income pooling less likely among dual-earner families. 
To our knowledge there is no systematic analyses of the effect of pooling on the allocation of 
expenditures one reason being that there has been no available data on how assignable consumption 
and not only clothing is distributed within the household. We expect that pooling not necessarily 
implies another allocation of expenditures, but that the variation in the allocation is smaller among 
pooling households than among non-pooling households. This follows from the argumentation that 
shared  management  and  a  common  household  budget  usually  found  within  income  pooling 
households makes the distribution of consumption more equal among the spouses (Vogler et al, 
2008). 
That income shares impact on the distribution of consumption is found in several studies, e.g. 
Bourguignon  et  al.,  1993;  Browning  et  al.,  1994;  Browning  &  Chiappori,  1997;  Lundberg  et   8 
al.,1997; Phipps & Burton, 1998; Thomas, 1990, and this has been used to reject the unitary model. 
However, in most cases these findings rely on information on a subset of assignable goods, which is 
not  a  binding  restriction  here  because  of  our  data,  see  chapter  3.  We  are  expecting  that  the 
distribution  of  all  assignable  goods  depends  on  the  income  distribution  within  non-pooling 




Table 2 around here 
 
In Table 2 we present summary statistics for the distribution of the wife’s share of expenditures for 
the two income pooling regimes. Although the mean and median is slightly higher for the ‘pooling’ 
households the difference is neither statistically significant for the mean (t-value of 1.01) nor for the 
median (t-value of .44). Turning to the distribution we see that the pooling distribution is somewhat 
more dispersed than the non-pooling distribution, while there is no big differential in the inter-
quartile  ranges.  A  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  for  equality  between  the  two  distributions  has  a 
probability value of .120, which implies that the two distributions are not significantly different 
from  each  other.  Thus  nonparametric  analysis  suggests  that  the  location  of  the  wife’s  share  of 
expenditure and the dispersion are independent of the income pooling regime. Note however, that 
this is an unconditional analysis that does not take account of the fact that pooling is correlated with 
other factors which may affect sharing. To investigate this we now turn to a regression analysis of 
the wife’s share of expenditure. 
 
5. Empirical models 
 
 In  our  empirical  analysis  we  consider  the  determinants  of  assigned  expenditure  (CONSSH). 
These are: her income share (INCSH); the pooling regime (POOLING = 1 if they report they are   9 
pooling income); the interaction between the wife’s income share and the distributional regime, and 
a number of candidate distribution factors (DISTFACT) (see table 1)..  
 
CONSSH = á + âINCSH + óPOOLING + Ö(INCSH * POOLING) +  èDISTFACT + å        
 
The form of the equation is designed to capture the differential effects discussed in the previous 
chapter. For example, a finding that the income share is only important for those who do not pool 
(an ‘insignificant’ coefficient on ‘INCSH’) would indicate that the regime has the expected effect. 
On the other hand, a finding that the crossed variable was insignificant but the income share is 
significant would indicate that pooling plays no role for the sharing of expenditures. Finally, if 
pooling does not become significant it means that the distributional regime has no impact on the 
sharing of resources within the household. 
Because  there  are  some  wives  and  husbands  who  report  no  individual  assigned  consumption 
within  the  fortnight  period  of  the  booklet  accounting,  we  use  two  sided  censored  regression 
methods. 
 
6.  Regression analyses 
 
We  see  that  for  individually  assigned  goods  (CONSH)  there  is  a  positive  and  significant 
correlation between the wife’s share of income and the wife’s share of consumption, i.e. the more 
she earns the more is spend on her controlling for total household income, see model 1 in table 3. 
Furthermore, we find that pooling (POOLING) does not impact on how the spouses are sharing their 
consumption:  at  the  mean  the  wife  within  a  pooling  regime  household  does  not  have a higher 
proportion of assignable goods than wives within non-pooling regimes. Neither was the dispersion 
of the shares of consumption found smaller in the pooling regime than in the non-pooling regime, 
see chapter 3. 
 
Table 3 around here 
   10 
The model also includes some information about individual characteristics suggesting that these 
may  vary  between  wives  and  husbands, and thereby explain somehow why the pooling regime 
doesn’t impact on the distribution of consumption. We find that only living in big cities (URBAN), 
the  husband  having  had  a  previous  partner  (HUSB#PARTNER),  years of marriage/cohabitation 
(YEARSMARRIAGE)  and  husbands  growing  up  with  a  full-time  working  mother 
(HUSBMOTHERFULLTIME)  impact  on  the  distribution  of  the  consumption,  i.e.  the  latter 
negatively. 
To  investigate  if  the  effect  of  income  shares  and  the  different  individual 
characteristics/distributional factors, is different within pooling than within non-pooling households, 
we  include  in  model  2  the  interaction  between  pooling  and  income  shares  as  well  as  between 
pooling and the distributional factors. 
As  expected,  we  find  a  negative  coefficient  for  the  pooling*income  share  interaction  term, 
which  indicates  that  the  distribution  of  income  has  a  stronger  (t-value  on  -1.37)  impact  on 
consumption  shares  among  non-pooling  households  than  among  pooling  households.  For  the 
significant distributional variables in model 1 we also find significant impacts when interacted with 
pooling as well as for no. of children and households, where the wife grew up with both parents, see 
model 2 in table 3. Thus, living in a bigger city increases her consumption share if living in an 
income pooling household, and the same holds for wives married to a partner who has had one or 
more  previous  partners.  Years  of  marriage  is  also  favoring  her  share  of  consumption,  whereas 
children and wives growing up with both of their parents have a smaller share of consumption, if 
they are pooling their incomes with their partner relatively to if they are not pooling their income. 
Finally, if we distinguish between pooling and non-pooling household doing regressions for the 
two groups separately, table 4 shows that income shares has a significant and positive impact in 
consumption  shares  within  non-income  pooling  households  but  not  within  income  pooling 
households controlling for the distributional factors used in model 2 in table 3. This is seen as a 
confirmation of the prediction following Beckerian income pooling for households reporting that   11 
they  are  pooling  their  incomes.  For  non-income  pooling  households  the  distribution  of  income 
matters for their sharing of consumption. 
 
 
Table 4 around here 
 
The conclusion therefore is that distributional factors impact on the sharing of consumption within 
households, and that controlling for these needs imply that the distribution of income matters more 




This article investigates the correlation between decision making and intra-household allocation 
within households, and thereby tries to close the gap between the economic psychology literature 
and the economic literature on this issue. Thus, where economic psychologists analyze who makes 
what  decisions  and  what  characterizes  the  decision-making  process,  economists  analyze  how 
spouse’s incomes are distributed within the household and with what result. 
The data used are from the Danish Household Survey, where additional questions are asked about 
for whom different goods purchased are bought, and, furthermore, which distributional regime the 
household  belongs  to.  Having  both  types  of  information  for  the  same  households  allows  for 
investigating income pooling and consumption sharing at the same time. 
The results show that a great majority of households declares that they are pooling their incomes, 
whereas pooling only some fraction of the incomes or running independent economies are rarely 
happening. We also find that although the wife’s income share on average is 43 percent she gets 52 
percent of the assigned consumption. 
For  non-pooling  households  the  distribution  of  income  between  the  spouses  matters  for  the 
distribution of the consumption, i.e. the sharing. The more she earns relatively to him the higher 
becomes her share of the spouses aggregated consumption. For pooling households, on the other   12 
hand, no such relationship is found although we controlled for several distributional factors found 
important for income regimes and the allocation of resources in other studies. 
The conclusion therefore is that when economic psychologists talk about income-pooling this 
follows  what  economists  consider  as  Beckerian  income  pooling,  whereas  non-income  pooling 
households’ consumption sharing is impacted by the spouses income distribution. 
     13 
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Table 1. 
Summary statistics – distributional regimes, consumption, income and sharing factors 
  Distribution 
Regimes (REGIME)  # cases 
Pooling  1186 (.68%) 
Non-pooling  561 (.32%) 
   
  Mean  St. dev. 
Income (1,000 DKK per year)     
Gross individual income  532.3  217.0 
- wife’s share of wife and husband’s gross incomes   .419  .141 
Gross household income  609.3  27.9 
Net individual income  298.8  106.4 
- wife’s share of wife and husband’s net incomes (INCSH)  .431  .154 
Net household income (HHINC)  360.4  177.5 
     
Expenditures (1,000 DKK per year)     
Assignable    122.4  63.8 
- individual   53.0  42.2 
-- wife’s share of wife and husband’s consumption   .533  .293 
- joint  69.3  40.7 
Non-assignable  161.7  97.7 
     
Distributional  factors
          
Net household income (logHHINC)   12.70  .428 
Husband had a previous partner (HUSBPREVPARTN)  .283  .450 
Wife had a previous partner (WIFEPREVPARTN)  .281  .449 
Husband 14 years old lived with both parents (HUSBBOTHPAR)  .872  .333 
Wife 14 years old lived with both parents (WIFEBOTHPAR)  .866  .341 
Husband’s mother was full-time worker (HUSBMOTHFULLTIME)  .431  .495 
Wife’s mother was full-time worker (HUSBMOTHFULLTIME)  .451  .498 
Years of marriage and cohabitation in present marriage (YEARSMARR)  13.11  10.15 
# of children (#CHILD)  .981  .021 
Owned house (OWNHOUSE)  .344  .475 
Capital or big towns (URBAN)  .609  .488 
   18 
Table 2 
The distribution of different consumption shares within pooling and non-pooling  
regimes. 1998-2004 
  Wife’s share of wife and husband’s consumption (CONSSH) 
 
  Pooling  Non-pooling 
Assigned individual consumption      
Mean  .538  .522 
St.dev.  .299  .282 
     
1. quartile  .312  .299 
2. quartile/median  .549  .536 
3. quartile  .778  .730 
     
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p-value  .120   
N:  1186  561 
Note: No significant differentials in means and medians between pooling and non-pooling regimes   19 
Table 3 
Wife’s consumption share explained by income shares, distributional regimes and sharing rule 
factors. Two sided censored regressions 
Note:  means significant: * at 5%, ** at 1%, *** at 0.1% and **** at 0.01-level 
1Stepwise tobit-regression with INCSH and POOLING as lockterms in model 1, and INCSH AND INCSH*POOLING 
as lockterms in model 2. For the other variables, see the list in table 1. 
Wife’s share of wife and husband’s consumption (CONSSH) 
Model 1  Model 2 






























































































      1557/ 
57/133 
   
N:  1747        1747     
Pseudo R2  .0198        .0243       20 
Table 4 
Wife’s consumption share explained by income shares and other other factors
1. Pooling versus non-
pooling households. Tobit-regressions. 
  CONSSH  
  Pooling  Non-pooling   
  Coefficient 
estimates 
Std.Err.  Coefficient 
estimates 
Std. Err.   
INCSH  .092  .063  .170*  .087   
Constant    .285  .336  -.190  .417   
           
Number of observations/left-
censored/right-censored 
1046/38/102    511/19/31     
Adjusted R
2  .034    .023     
N:  1186    561     
+,*,**,***significant on .1, .05, .01 or .001-levels 
1The model includes all the variables from the regression in table 3, i.e. exclusive of interaction variables.    
 